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INTRODUCTION
In Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) ordered the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) and the United States, represented by the Department
of Justice (DOJ),1 to submit separate briefs to the court unless they could agree
to a joint position.' In issuing this unusual order,3 the court anticipated that the
views of the PTO and DOJ might differ because of the agencies' disagreement
over the proper standard of patent eligibility. In Association for Molecular Pa-
thology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,4 decided earlier that year, the DOJ argued that
isolated genomic DNA (gDNA) was not patent-eligible, contradicting the
PTO's longtime practice of granting patents to applications claiming gDNA in-
ventions. Solicitor General (SG) Neal Katyal made an unprecedented appear-
ance before the Federal Circuit to explain this position.5 In response, the PTO
refused to sign the DOJ's brief.6
Consumer Watchdog and Myriad recast debates about the SG's institutional
role in representing executive agencies. Although most commentators agree
that the SG acts as a presidential agent,7 they generally conclude that the SG's
1. In most cases involving federal agencies, the DOJ files a single brief on behalf of
all federal parties. See infra note 10 and accompanying text. This brief is typically
designated the "Brief for the United States." For clarity, this Note refers to briefs
filed by the DOJ and the Solicitor General as the DOJ's and the SG's briefs, re-
spectively.
2. See Order, Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found. at i, No. 13-1377
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 4, 2013). The Federal Circuit allowed that the PTO and the DOJ
could file a joint brief, if they chose to do so, and participate jointly or separately
in oral argument. See id. at 1-2. Ultimately, the agencies chose to submit a joint
brief, and an attorney from the DOJ's Civil Appellate Section represented both
agencies during oral argument. See Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research
Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1377).
3. Notably, the Federal Circuit has invited the PTO to submit amicus briefs in sever-
al of its en banc cases. See Ryan Vacca, Acting Like an Administrative Agency: The
Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 MO. L. REV. 733, 743 & n.48 (2011) (citing Order, The-
rasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 374 F. App'x 35, 36 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per
curiam); Order, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(per curiam)).
4. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
5. See infra Section II.B.
6. See infra Section II.B.
7. Lincoln Caplan popularized the view of the SG as independent from the President
and other executive branch officials involved in policymaking. See LINCOLN
CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW
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litigating authority is an inadequate mechanism for exercising presidential con-
trol over agency policymaking, especially when compared to other mechanisms,
such as administrative policy and budgetary review and the President's ap-
pointment and removal powers.8 However, this Note argues, the SG's policy-
making relevance varies across institutional contexts. In contexts where other
control mechanisms are weak, the SG's litigating authority may be an effective,
if not ideal, means for ensuring that agency policies are consistent with the
President's preferences and those of other executive branch actors.9 Patent law
exemplifies this dynamic. Although PTO's specialization limits the effectiveness
of direct oversight, the SG's litigating authority facilitates indirect review of the
PTO's policies, preventing the agency from monopolizing patent policy.
This Note proceeds in five Parts. Part I describes the SG's role in agency lit-
igation, including the SG's role in coordinating agency policy and the SG's tre-
mendous success before the Supreme Court. Part II shows that the SG's influ-
ence is even greater in patent law, and that the SG has used its litigating
authority to convince the Court to adopt its doctrinal recommendations, and,
in one case, to override the PTO's position on a core requirement of patentabil-
(1987). However, Caplan's view has been criticized by scholars and practitioners,
who have noted that the SG's "functional autonomy" from the President and oth-
er executive officials "does not translate into substantive freedom from the poli-
cies and politics of the White House." REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 175 (1992). The SG's functional autonomy, moreo-
ver, is not absolute, and Presidents have repeatedly intervened to determine the
United States' legal positions. Id.; Drew S. Days III, When the President Says "No":
A Few Thoughts on Executive Power and the Tradition of Solicitor General Inde-
pendence, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 509 (2001). Consistent with these criticisms,
studies have found that the SG's behavior corresponds to changes in the Presi-
dent's position. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Solicitor General as Mediator Between
Court and Agency, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 185, 191 & n.25; Stephen S. Meinhold &
Steven A. Shull, Policy Congruence Between the President and the Solicitor General,
51 POL. RES. Q. 527, 527 (1998).
8. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice
Control of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 578 (2003) ("DOJ control of
federal litigation is inadequate, arguably an irrelevant, and possibly a perverse way
of achieving presidential control of agency policymaking.").
9. As Lisa Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh have shown, "presidential" admin-
istration of agency policymaking involves a multiplicity of executive branch ac-
tors, who may not share a consistent set of preferences. See Lisa Schultz Bressman
& Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the
Practice of Presidential Control, 1O5 MICH. L. REv. 47, 49 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein,
Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Reali-
ties, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1854-55 (2013). Although the SG is formally accounta-
ble only to the President and the Attorney General, see 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2012), the
SG's interagency process, described infra Part I, provides a forum for the many
principal-agent interactions that characterize Bressman and Vandenbergh's mod-
el.
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ity. Parts III and IV argue that the PTO's specialization greatly weakens the ef-
fectiveness of administrative policy review and other presidential control mech-
anisms, but that the SG compensates for these weaknesses. Consistent with the
fire-alarm model of political control, the SG acts like a fire dispatcher, raising
the alarm when the PTO's actions diverge from the President's preferences and
those of other executive branch actors. Part V evaluates the fire-alarm model. It
concludes that the arguments for eliminating the SG's litigating authority are
unpersuasive, but that, in some cases, the SG's litigating authority may conflict
with the need to accurately present the PTO's views. Where appropriate, the SG
should authorize the PTO to dissent from the DOJ's brief, and the Court should
endorse the Federal Circuit's practice of independently calling for the PTO's
views. A brief conclusion follows.
I. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS COORDINATOR
Except where otherwise provided by statute, the SG controls all agency liti-
gation before the Supreme Court, including both cases in which an agency is a
party and cases in which the agency is an amicus.° This institutional arrange-
ment trades the agency's substantive expertise for the SG's litigating expertise,
and the SG enjoys unequaled success before the Court because of its compe-
tence, reputation, and other institutional advantages. The Court grants the SG's
petition for certiorari approximately 70% of the time (compared to 3% for other
litigants)." And when the SG participates as amicus, the Court adopts the SG's
recommendation to grant or deny certiorari 75% of the time.'2 At the merits
stage, the SG prevails 6o-70% of the time.3
lO. The SG's litigating authority derives from the DOJ's litigating authority. See 28
U.S.C. § 516 (2012) ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litiga-
tion in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is inter-
ested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of
Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General."); see also id. §§ 517-518 (au-
thorizing the Attorney General and the SG to represent the United States in state,
federal, and foreign courts). Agencies are generally not allowed to employ attor-
neys or counsels to conduct litigation and must refer matters to the DOJ. See 5
U.S.C. § 31o6 (2012). Congress has specifically granted independent litigating au-
thority to certain independent agencies. For a discussion of exceptions to the
DOJ's litigating authority, see Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor
General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994). For
a general history of agency litigating authority, see Neal Devins & Michael Herz,
The Battle That Never Was: Congress, The White House, and Agency Litigation Au-
thority, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205 (1998).
11. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General's Chang-
ing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1335 (2010).
12. Id. at 1334.
13. Id.
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However, this arrangement necessarily delegates some of the agency's poli-
cymaking functions to the SG. Occasionally, the SG adopts a litigating position
that contradicts the agency's policy. This occurs because other government ac-
tors disagree with the agency's position, and those actors prevail in the SG's de-
liberations.14 Alternately, it occurs because the SG believes that the issues should
not be decided by the agency alone, or because the SG disagrees with the agen-
cy's proposed litigating strategy.'5 In response, the agency may refuse to sign the
SG's brief if the SG (or President) cannot convince it to change its posture.6 In
rare circumstances, usually limited to disagreements between the SG and inde-
pendent agencies, the SG permits a dissenting agency to present its views in an
addendum to the SG's brief or separate filing. 7
Whether the SG adopts the agency's position often depends on the exist-
ence of conflicting government interests in the pending litigation. To discover
these interests, the SG's assistants canvass the White House and other agencies.
The SG invites interested parties to submit memoranda summarizing their po-
sitions, which the SG synthesizes into a longer memorandum that becomes the
foundation for the SG's brief." If the SG receives contradictory input, and the
SG cannot immediately decide which position to adopt, the SG contacts the in-
terested parties to discuss their respective positions.'9 When many parties are
involved, the SG may convene meetings between opposing representatives.2"
The effectiveness of this system depends greatly on the participants' perceptions
of procedural fairness. If the SG can convince an agency that the SG's decision
was fair, the SG can avoid backlash if the SG's position contradicts the agency's
policy.2
14. Lemos, supra note 7, at 192-95.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 195.
17. See Devins, supra note lo, at 314-15; see also infra Part V (discussing dual represen-
tation strategies).
18. Interview with Drew Days III, former Solicitor General, in New Haven, Conn.
(Mar. 5, 2014). Days's recollections resemble scholarly descriptions of the SG's in-
teragency process. See SALOKAR, supra note 7, at 63 ("When a case arrives ... assis-
tants [to the SG] prepare a memo discussing both the strengths and weaknesses of
the case with a recommendation on whether the government should seek re-
view.... Any disagreement.., calls for further information gathering. The assis-
tants are responsible for consulting attorneys in the various divisions of the De-
partment of Justice, the agencies, or executive departments initially involved in
the case.").
19. Interview with Days, supra note 18.
20. Id.
21. Days recalls a conversation with the head of an agency whose policy he had de-
clined to adopt. Although the head expressed unhappiness with the SG's position,
he praised Days for providing the agency with a fair opportunity to present its
opinions. Interview with Days, supra note 18.
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II. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IN PATENT LAW
Like other executive agencies, the PTO is subject to the SG's litigating au-
thority.22 When the PTO is involved in litigation, whether as a party or as an
amicus, the DOJ files a brief on the PTO's behalf, which the PTO cosigns.23 In
cases before the Supreme Court, the SG determines the United States' position
according to the procedures discussed in Part 1.24 Consequently, as the United
States' sole representative in these cases, the SG is well-positioned to influence
the Court's patent law decisions.5 The SG has used its position to convince the
Court to adopt its doctrinal recommendations and, in one case, to override the
PTO's established policy regarding the patent-eligibility of isolated genetic ma-
terials.
A. The Solicitor General's Influence
The SG's influence in patent law has not escaped commentators' attention.
John Duffy argues that the SG's role has dramatically expanded in the last ten
years because of the Supreme Court's increasing interest in patent law and its
practice of issuing "Call for the Views of the Solicitor General" or "CVSG" or-
ders in these cases.26 Duffy finds that in the 1994-2007 Terms, the Court issued
twenty CVSG orders in patent cases and adopted the SG's recommendation in
22. Telephone Interview with former member of the Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Pa-
tent & Trademark Office (Feb. 24, 2014).
23. Id. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013), dis-
cussed infra, is an exception to the PTO's practice of cosigning the DOJ's brief.
Notably, the PTO has historically enjoyed some informal independence from the
DOJ, and in the 199os, the PTO's Office of the Solicitor frequently represented the
PTO before both district and appellate courts. See, e.g., In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447,
1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev'd sub nom. Dickenson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999);
Markman v. Lehman, 987 F. Supp. 25, 28 (D.D.C. 1997).
24. Telephone Interview with former member of the Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Pa-
tent & Trademark Office, supra note 22.
25. The courts are especially relevant in patent law because the common law is the
"dominant legal force" in its development. Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the
Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 53 (2010).
26. John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 518, 525 (2010). Between the Federal Circuit's creation in 1982 and
the emergence of the trends identified by Duffy, the Supreme Court's presence in
patent law was largely "invisible." See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the
Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 387-89. For an analysis of the Su-
preme Court's review of the Federal Circuit, see generally Ryan Stephenson, Note,
Federal Circuit Case Selection at the Supreme Court: An Empirical Analysis, 102
GEO. L.J. 271 (2013).
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seventeen.7 In the six cases in which the Court adopted the SG's recommenda-
tion to grant certiorari, it also adopted the SG's merits recommendations." The
SG's influence is so remarkable, Duffy argues, that it overshadows that of the
Federal Circuit. The Court adopted the SG's recommendations in nine of nine
cases in which the SG's position contradicted the Federal Circuit's decision.9
Similarly, Colleen Chien finds that the SG's influence extends to voluntary ami-
cus participation. In the 1999-20o9 Terms, the Court adopted the SG's recom-
mendation in twenty-seven of thirty available amicus briefs filed in patent cas-
es.3° This success rate exceeds the SG's already impressive general success rate.1
These trends have continued. In the 2008-2013 Terms, the Supreme Court
issued CVSG orders in ten cases, and followed the SG's recommendation in all
but two, one of which was dismissed by the parties.32 During this time period,
the Court also adopted the SG's merits recommendations in eight of thirteen
cases in which the SG participated as a party or as an amicus.3 3 And in one case,
the Court adopted the SG's substantive recommendations without adopting its
dispositional recommendations.
3 4
27. Duffy, supra note 26, at 531. One of the three remaining cases was settled before
the SG could respond. Id. Prior to 1994, the SG exercised some influence in patent
law, but only on an inconsistent basis. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme
Court's leading case on Section loi, the SG's influence was critical. 447 U.S. 303
(198o). When the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), the Federal Cir-
cuit's predecessor, upheld an applicant's patent for a genetically modified bacte-
rium, PTO Commissioner Donald Banner attempted to block the government's
appeal to the Supreme Court. See Daniel J. Kevles, Anada Chakrabarty Wins a Pa-
tent: Biotechnology, Law, and Society, 1972-198o, 25 HIST. STUD. PHYSICAL & BIOL.
SCI. 111, 126 (1994). Solicitor General Wade McCree confronted Banner and re-
minded him that the SG, not the PTO, possessed the sole authority to decide
whether to appeal. Id. at 126-27. McCree filed a petition for certiorari, and the Su-
preme Court affirmed. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318. Chief Justice Burger's conclu-
sion that § lol's scope includes "anything under the sun that is made by man," id.
at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, at 5 (1952)), became a touchstone for determin-
ing subject-matter eligibility, see Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 641-43 (2010).
28. Duffy, supra note 26, at 531.
29. Id. at 539.
30. This set includes both certiorari and merits amicus briefs. Colleen V. Chien, Pa-
tent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts' Friends Can Teach Us About the Patent Sys-
tem, I U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 397, 429 (2011).
31. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 11, at 1333-34.
32. See infra Appendix A.
33. See infra Appendix A.
34. In Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014), the SG criticized
the Federal Circuit's definiteness standard, but recommended affirmance because
the claims at issue remained indefinite under the SG's proposed definiteness
standard. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 12-16, Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. 2120 (No. 13-369). The Supreme Court adopted the
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Admittedly, the SG's influence varies from year to year. In the 2008 and
2009 Terms, the Supreme Court did not issue a single CVSG order to a patent
case appealed from the Federal Circuit.35 In the 2012 and 2013 Terms, the Court
issued three such orders.36 Additionally, in the 20,0 31 and 201138 Terms, the SG
suffered a small but significant losing streak, losing four cases, including the
Court's highly publicized decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc.39 Nevertheless, the SG is likely to remain an important actor
in patent law for as long as the Supreme Court maintains its interest. And there
is little evidence that the Court's interest is diminishing. In the 2013 Term, the
Court heard seven patent cases,4° and as of February 2015, the Court heard one
patent case in the 2014 Term and issued a CVSG order in another.
4'
B. Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.
The Myriad litigation provides a dramatic example of the SG's influence.
The Myriad plaintiffs, a coalition of public interest litigants, challenged seven of
Myriad's patents on the BRCAi and BRCA2 genes, used in diagnostic tests for
breast cancer. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the PTO's Utility
Guidelines, which permitted inventors to patent isolated DNA,42 were incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's precedents interpreting § ioi of the Patent Act
to prohibit patents on "laws of nature."43
SG's recommended standard in its opinion, but vacated and remanded. See Nau-
tilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124.
35. See infra Appendix A.
36. See infra Appendix A.
37. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); Bd. of Trustees of Le-
land Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).
38. See Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 169o (2012); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prome-
theus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
39. 132 S. Ct. 1289.
40. See infra Appendix A.
41. See infra Appendix A.
42. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093-94 (Jan. 5, 2001) ("Thus,
an inventor's discovery of a gene can be the basis for a patent on the genetic com-
position isolated from its natural state and processed through purifying steps that
separate the gene from other molecules naturally associated with it.").
43. See Complaint at 3, 29, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office (Myriad 1), 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-4515); see also Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genet-
ics, Inc. (Myriad V), 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398) ("The patenting of isolated
DNA violates long-established Supreme Court precedent that prohibits the pa-
tenting of laws of nature, natural phenomena, products of nature, and abstract
ideas."). Section iol, which defines patent-eligible subject matter, provides that
33:427 2015
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On appeal to the Federal Circuit (Myriad 1I),44 the DOJ announced the
United States' position on the patent-eligibility of genetic materials.4 Although
the DOJ and SG had defended the PTO's guidelines in previous cases,46 the
DOJ's brief rejected both the plaintiffs' and the PTO's positions. Correctly in-
terpreted, the DOJ argued, the Supreme Court's precedents only permitted cer-
tain genetic materials to be patented: complementary DNA (cDNA),47 and oth-
er synthetically engineered molecules, were patent-eligible, but isolated,
unmodified genomic DNA (gDNA) was not.a4 The DOJ acknowledged that this
conclusion was "contrary to the longstanding practice of the [PTO]" but stated
that the case "prompted the United States to reevaluate the relationship be-
tween such patents and the settled principle under Supreme Court precedent
that the patent laws do not extend to products of nature."49 Significantly, the
DOJ's statement of interests listed the PTO as only one of a large number of in-
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The Supreme Court has held that the prohibition on the
patenting of laws of nature is an "important implicit exception" to § 1O, which
recognizes that the laws of nature "are basic tools of scientific and technological
work," and that patents on these tools would "inhibit future innovation premised
upon them." Myriad V, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at
1293, 1301).
44. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad II), 653
F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
45. In the district court case, the DOJ represented the PTO, which was joined as a co-
defendant. See Myriad 1, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 183. The DOJ did not adopt a position
on the plaintiffs' patent-eligibility claims, and its motion to dismiss only ad-
dressed the plaintiffs' standing. See Defendant United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1, Myriad
1, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-4515).
46. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party,
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc. at 11, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012)
(No. 10-1150); Brief for the Respondent at 38-9, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593
(2010) (No. 08-964).
47. cDNA refers to DNA that has been generated from messenger RNA through re-
verse transcription. For an introductory discussion of the underlying biochemical
principles, see Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 198-99.
48. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 9-1o,
Myriad 11, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1406) (arguing that that "the dis-
trict court erroneously cast doubt on the patent-eligibility of" cDNA, but that
"genomic DNA that has merely been isolated from the human body, without fur-
ther alteration or manipulation, is not patent-eligible").
49. Id. at 13.
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terested agencies.5" The PTO refused to endorse the DOJ's position, and did not
sign the DOJ's brief.
51
During oral argument, Acting SG Neal Katyal made an unprecedented ap-
pearance before the Federal Circuit to present the government's position.5"
However, the SG failed to persuade the court.5 Instead, the Federal Circuit held
that isolated gDNA was patent-eligible, explaining that its decision "com-
port[ed] with the longstanding practice of the PTO"54:
[T]he PTO has issued patents directed to DNA molecules for almost
thirty years. In the early 198os, the Office granted the first human gene
patents. It is estimated that the PTO has issued 2,645 patents claiming
"isolated DNA" over the past twenty-nine years, and that by 2005, had
granted 40,000 DNA-related patents covering, in non-native form,
twenty percent of the genes in the human genome. In 2001, the PTO is-
sued Utility Examination Guidelines, which reaffirmed the agency's po-
sition that isolated DNA molecules are patent eligible, and Congress
has not indicated that the PTO's position is inconsistent with § ioi. If
the law is to be changed, and DNA inventions excluded from the broad
scope of § lOl contrary to the settled expectation of the inventing
community, the decision must come not from the courts, but from
Congress."
5
The Supreme Court granted, vacated, and remanded (Myriad 111)56 the Federal
Circuit's decision with instructions to consider the Court's Mayo decision.57 On
remand (Myriad IV), the Federal Circuit affirmed its earlier decision. In affirm-
ing, the court reiterated its support for longstanding PTO practice."
50. These interests included the National Institutes of Health, the DOJ's Antitrust Di-
vision, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, and the National Economic Council. Id. at vi.
51. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, su-
pra note 48.
52. Letter from Neal Katyal, Acting Solicitor General, to Jan Horbaly, Clerk of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Feb. iO, 2011),
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/katyal-letter.pdf (requesting that the Federal
Circuit hear oral arguments on Apr. 4, 2o11, so that Katyal could argue personal-
ly).
53. Myriad 11, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
54. Id. at 1354.
55. Id. at 1354-55 (internal citations omitted).
56. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (Myriad III), 132 S. Ct.
1794 (2012).
57. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
58. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad IV),
689 F.3d 1303, 1332-34 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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The Supreme Court again granted certiorari and reversed (Myriad V),
adopting the SG's recommendation, which distinguished between the patent-
eligibility of cDNA and gDNA, over the petitioners' and the PTO's positions.
59
The Court demonstrated significantly greater sensitivity to the SG's judgment
than the Federal Circuit had, opining that "the United States argued in the Fed-
eral Circuit and in this Court that isolated DNA was not patent eligible under
§io, and that the PTO's practice was not 'a sufficient reason to hold that isolat-
ed DNA is patent-eligible."'6 ° The DOJ and SG's position, the Court concluded,
"undercut[]" whatever authority ought to be attributed to the PTO's practice.6 '
III. PRESIDENTIAL CONTROLS IN PATENT LAW
The PTO is usually considered a "weak" agency62 because it does not pos-
sess the authority to make rules interpreting the substantive provisions of the
Patent Act, such as § ioi's definition of patent-eligible subject matter.63 Howev-
er, the PTO may establish procedural rules "govern[ing] the conduct of [its]
59. 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).
6o. Id. at 2119 (citing Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 26, Myriad V, 133
S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398)). Justice Ginsburg expressed similar sentiments in
oral argument. Oral Argument Transcript at 51, Myriad V, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
(No. 12-398) (citations omitted) (proposing that the SG's disavowal of the PTO's
position "diluted" the presumption in its favor).
61. Myriad V, 133 S. Ct. at 2119.
62. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1791, 1820 (2013).
63. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[T]he broadest
of the PTO's rulemaking powers.., authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate
regulations directed only to 'the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]'; it does
[not] grant the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules." (first al-
teration in original)). Congress has consistently rejected the possibility of delegat-
ing substantive rulemaking authority to the PTO in amending the Patent Act. See
John M. Golden, The USPTO's Soft Power: Who Needs Chevron Deference?, 66
SMU L. REV. 541, 545 (2013). Whether the Congress should, as a policy matter, del-
egate substantive rulemaking authority to the PTO is beyond the scope of this
Note. For discussions of the underlying policy issues, see Michael J. Burstein,
Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 18o6 (2011) (recommending "grant-
ing the PTO substantive rule-making authority"); Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating
Patents, 2010 SuP. CT. REV. 275, 279 (arguing "for Congress to endow the PTO
with substantive rule-making authority"); and Melissa Wasserman, The Changing
of the Guard in Patent Law, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959 (2013) (arguing that the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.), delegates substantive rulemaking
authority to the PTO). See also Golden, supra, at 545-46 (expressing skepticism
that the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act implicitly granted the PTO substantive
rulemaking authority).
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proceedings."64 Under this authority, the PTO promulgates guidelines that con-
trol its examiners' actions in applying the relevant provisions of the Patent
Act.6 Although these guidelines are formally procedural, and not entitled to
Chevron deference,66 they determine the conditions under which applications
will be granted absent a contrary judicial interpretation of the statute.
67
Presidents control agency policymaking through a variety of mechanisms,
including the administrative policy and budgetary review processes, the ap-
pointment and removal of agency officers, and the appointment of independent
executive branch officials or "czars,"68 who coordinate activities with respect to
particular policy areas. Together, these control mechanisms perform both
command and coordination functions: they ensure that agency policies are con-
sistent with the President's preferences and with those of other executive branch
actors, including other White House principals and non-PTO agencies.
69 How-
ever, the effectiveness of these mechanisms varies between institutional con-
texts. And in patent law, the PTO's specialization greatly weakens these mecha-
nisms, increasing the importance of indirect oversight, exercised through the
SG's litigating authority.
64. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2012).
65. See, e.g., 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg.
74,618 (Dec. 16, 2014). The PTO also issues guidance memoranda to examiners di-
rectly, bypassing informal rulemaking procedures. See, e.g., Andrew H. Hirshfeld,
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Memorandum, 2014 Procedure for Subject Mat-
ter Eligibility Analysis of Claims Reciting or Involving Laws of Nature/Natural
Principles, Natural Phenomena, and/or Natural Products (March 4, 2014).
66. This follows from Congress's failure to delegate substantive rulemaking authority
to the PTO. See Merck, 80 F.3d at 155o; see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 229 (2001) ("[A] very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron
treatment is express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of
rulemaking or adjudication that produces the regulations or rulings for which
deference is claimed."); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (holding that a reviewing court must defer to an agen-
cy's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute).
67. See, e.g., Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1097-98 (Jan. 5, 2001).
68. See generally Aaron J. Saiger, Obama's "Czars" for Domestic Policy and the Law of
the White House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577 (2010). President Obama has
faced criticism for his perceived overreliance on "czars." See Kay Bailey
Hutchison, Obama's Many Policy Czars Let Administration Elude Accountability,
WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ ar-
ticle/20o9/og/11/AR200o911o35o4.html.
69. See, e.g., infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
33:427 2015
THE GOVERNMENT'S FIRE DISPATCHER
A. Administrative Policy Review
Pursuant to a series of executive orders, the PTO, like other executive agen-
cies, must submit all significant rulemaking proposals to the Office of Infor-
mation and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) before publishing the proposed rule.7"
OIRA may approve the rule with or without changes, return the rule to the
proposing agency, or encourage the agency to withdraw the rule.7' Although
OIRA may refuse to approve a proposed rule, OIRA may not compel the pro-
posing agency to adopt specific changes.7 OIRA may suggest changes formally
or informally, but the agency may decline these suggestions.73 OIRA receives
advice from White House principals, other federal agencies, and the public. 74 As
one former OIRA Administrator described, "OIRA is largely in the business of
helping to identify and aggregate views and perspectives of a wide range of
sources both inside and outside the federal government."
75
However, five factors make the OIRA review process poorly suited to con-
trolling PTO rulemaking. First, the President and other interested executive
branch actors may not be able to effectively review the PTO rulemaking because
of patent law's technical and legal complexity. Patent law is an especially com-
plex domain because it governs a wide variety of subject matter areas-from
biology to chemistry to engineering-and patent law's doctrines are themselves
"arcane" and "particularly hard to grasp."6 Although the President has signifi-
cant resources at its disposal, the President's need to manage a large number of
issues across the executive branch prevents it from specializing in any one ar-
ea. 
7
Second, the President and other actors may not have strong preferences in
patent law. During the past century, Presidents have rarely mentioned the pa-
70. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 6Ol
app. at 86-91 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Presidents Bush and Obama modified E.O.
12,866 in subsequent orders. However, these orders preserve the requirement for
OIRA review. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2011), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 61o app. at 101-02 (20o6 & Supp. V 2011) (reaffirming E.O. 12,866's "prin-
ciples, structures and definition governing contemporary regulatory review"). For
a discussion of OIRA's review of agency rulemaking, see Sunstein, supra note 9.
For a general discussion of Presidential review of agencies, see Elena Kagan, Presi-
dential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
71. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1846-47.
72. Id. at 1848.
73. Id. at 1847-48.
74. Id. at 1840.
75. Id.
76. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 12 (2010).
77. See generally Kagan, supra note 70, at 2352-58.
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tent system alongside their major agenda items,8 and "[n]either the Democrat-
ic nor Republican parties have fixed or coherent platform positions on intellec-
tual property that reflect overarching party policies."7 9
Third, the President and other actors may not be able to determine the po-
litical and policy effects of the PTO's rulemaking until after the rule has been
approved. For example, a patent's monopoly may create significant (or at least
politically salient) problems for downstream innovation."o However, this may
not be known until after the patented invention has been commercialized or
subsequent discoveries have been made.
Fourth, the President may be unwilling to order the PTO to change its rules
because presidential micromanagement increases the likelihood that agency
rule changes will be challenged and reversed in court. The Supreme Court has
held than an agency's rule change is subject to a heightened explanatory re-
quirement where the agency's existing policy "has engendered significant reli-
ance interests,'"8" and the Federal Circuit reviews the PTO's interpretations of
78. Since 1912, when President Taft proposed legislation to protect foreign exhibitors
at the Panama-Pacific International Exposition from patent and copyright in-
fringement, only Presidents Obama and Bush have mentioned patents in their
State of the Union Addresses. See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress
on the State of the Union, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 50, at 3 (Jan. 28, 2014);
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 44
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 117, 118 (Jan. 28, 20o8); Address Before a Joint Session
of the Congress on the State of the Union, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 145, 151
(Jan. 31, 2006); William Howard Taft, Fourth Annual Message, in 4 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 336, 347 (David H. Burton ed.,
2002). For searchable versions of presidential statements, see The American Presi-
dency Project, UNIV. CAL., SANTA BARBARA, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu
/index.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2015).
79. Ann Bartow, When Bias Is Bipartisan: Teaching the Democratic Process in an Intel-
lectual Property Law Republic, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L. REV. 715, 719 (2008).
8o. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation: The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 28o SCI. 698 (1998); Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007); Carl
Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard
Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Ler-
ner & Scott Stern eds., 2001).
81. See F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). Both the Su-
preme Court and the Federal Circuit have recognized the importance of protect-
ing reliance interests in patent law. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 729 (2002) ("[C]ourts must be cautious before adopt-
ing changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community."
(citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997)));
Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("If the law is to be changed, and
DNA inventions excluded from the broad scope of § iol contrary to the settled
expectation of the inventing community, the decision must come not from the
courts, but from Congress."); see also Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO's Asymmet-
ric Incentives: Pressure to Expand Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 421
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the substantive provisions of the Patent Act without deference.s2 If the PTO
contracted the scope of patent-eligiblity, private parties invested in the broader
standard could challenge the PTO's rulemaking and exploit these doctrines to
preserve the existing policy. Even an unsuccessful challenge might delay the de-
sired policy change.
Finally, the President may be unwilling to order the PTO to change its rules
because doing so would jeopardize the reliance interests discussed above,"3
thereby presenting political opponents with a campaign issue.
Many of these factors were present in Myriad, discussed in Part II. The con-
sequences of the PTO's 2001 Utility Examination Guidelines on biotechnology
research were not known, or at least not fully appreciated, when the guidelines
were promulgated. Although the NIH and other commentators criticized the
guidelines8 4 their political weakness meant that their criticisms were not seri-
ously considered during the rulemaking process.8 5 After the PTO adopted the
guidelines, political opposition to gene patents increased. Myriad's patents on
the BRCAi and BRCA2 genes were highly controversial and motivated several
unsuccessful egislative patent reform initiatives.6 However, the guidelines' ex-
istence constrained the range of policy options, and, at the time the DOJ an-
nounced the United States' position in Myriad, voiding the guidelines through
litigation was likely the least costly option for contracting the scope of patent-
eligibility. A presidential directive to revise the guidelines through rulemaking
would likely have been challenged by Myriad and other patentees, requiring the
SG and DOJ to defend the policy change in court regardless.
B. Other Political Controls
In addition to administrative policy review, Presidents control agency poli-
cymaking through budgetary review and the appointment and removal of agen-
cy officers and independent executive branch officials. However, again because
(2011) (discussing the Federal Circuit's recognition of reliance interests). But see
Myriad V, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119 n.7 ("Concerns about reliance interests arising from
PTO determinations, insofar as they are relevant, are better directed to Con-
gress.").
82. See supra note 63.
83. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
84. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093-94 (Jan. 5, 2001) ("Thus,
an inventor's discovery of a gene can be the basis for a patent on the genetic com-
position isolated from its natural state and processed through purifying steps that
separate the gene from other molecules naturally associated with it.").
85. Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for
Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1257 (2012).
86. See E. Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy
Storm, 12 GENETICS MED. S39, S48 (2010).
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of the PTO's structure and specialization, these controls are poorly suited to in-
fluencing the PTO's policies.
1. Administrative Budgetary Review
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), OIRA's parent agency, re-
views and approves agency budgetary proposals on an annual basis.8" However,
OMB's budgetary review is a poor substitute for effective policy review. Agency
line items may only correspond weakly with agency policies. The PTO's budget
and justification, for example, largely concerns its operational activities, not the
PTO's positions on subject-matter eligibility and other doctrinal issues."8
Moreover, OMB's budgetary review is subject to the same limitations as OIRA's
policy review. As argued above, patent policy conflicts may not arise because of
the PTO's outright disobedience, but because the President and the President's
agents cannot effectively predict the policy and political consequences of pro-
posed rules.
2. Appointment and Removal
The President appoints the PTO's Director with the advice and consent of
the Senate, and may remove the Director at will.89 However, the effectiveness of
the appointment and removal powers is constrained by the pool of available
candidates. Ideally, from the President's perspective, appointees will be both
competent and loyal. But if an office is subject to high competence require-
ments, the size of the candidate pool will be limited, and the President may be
forced to choose competence over loyalty.90 If this occurs, the officer's prefer-
ences may only weakly align with the President's (assuming the President has
strong preferences). Although the empirical data are too coarse to measure
whether this tradeoff occurs in the appointment of the Director,9 there is some
evidence that the Director is subject to greater competence requirements than
87. See J6n R. B16ndal, Dirk-Jan Kraan & Michael Ruffner, Budgeting in the United
States, OECD J. ON BUDGETING, Nov. 2003, at 7, 11, 17.
88. See, e.g., Fiscal Year 2015 President's Budget Submission/Congressional Justification,
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Mar. 13, 2015),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/about/stratplan/budget/fylspbr.pdf.
89. 35 U.S.C. §§ 3(a)(1), 3(a)(4) (2012).
90. See Gary E. Hollibaugh, Jr., Naive Cronyism and Neutral Competence: Patronage,
Performance, and Policy Agreement in Executive Appointments, 25 J. PUB. ADMIN.,
REs. & THEORY (forthcoming 2015); Gary E. Hollibaugh, Jr., Gabriel Horton
& David E. Lewis, Presidents and Patronage, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1024, 1026 (2014).
91. Gary Hollibaugh, Gabriel Horton, and David Lewis, for example, do not distin-
guish between appointments at the PTO and the Department of Commerce's oth-
er subagencies. See Hollibaugh, Horton & Lewis, supra note 90.
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similar offices. Unlike the Copyright Act,9 2 the Patent Act requires that the Di-
rector and Deputy Director have "professional background and experience in
patent or trademark law," 93 and eight of the eleven living people who have
headed the PTO are registered patent attorneys or agents,94 who have satisfied
the PTO's scientific and technical requirements and passed the PTO's registra-
tion examination.95 These facts, combined with the complexities of patent law
discussed in Part III.A, suggest that the President faces greater constraints in
appointing the Director than comparable officers. Once the Director is ap-
pointed, moreover, the President is unlikely to remove (or threaten to remove)
the Director because of policy disagreements. Even if the President strongly dis-
agrees with the Director, the President may be unwilling to pay the political
costs of exercising removal,6 especially if finding and confirming a replacement
will be difficult.
97
These limitations on appointment and removal extend to the PTO's inferi-
or officers. The Secretary of Commerce appoints the Deputy Director, but the
Director nominates candidates for the position.9s The Secretary also appoints
Commissioners of Patents and Trademarks, who serve as the PTO's chief oper-
ating officers for their respective divisions.99 However, Commissioners are often
longtime PTO employees, not true political appointees.°° Similarly, many of
92. The Copyright Act establishes no professional requirements for the Register of
Copyrights. See 17 U.S.C. § 701 (2012).
93. 35 U.S.C. §§ 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1) (2012).
94. These statistics are derived from the author's search of the roster of registered pa-
tent attorneys and agents. The roster is available for download at the PTO's web-
site. See Office of Enrollment & Discipline, Patent Attorney/Agent Search, U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https:// oedci.uspto.gov/OEDCI (last updated Jan.
31, 2015).
95. See 37 C.F.R. § 11.7 (2014); OFFICE OF ENROLLMENT & DISCIPLINE, U.S. PATENT
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO THE
EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 4-8 (2014).
96. See Kagan, supra note 70, at 2274 ("[T]he President often cannot make effective
use of his removal power given the political costs of doing so.... ").
97. The PTO Director's recent history suggests that this is the case. The office re-
mained vacant for more than two years, between David Kappos's resignation in
January 2013 and Michelle Lee's confirmation in March 2015. See 161 CONG. REC.
S1341 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2015); 159 CONG. REC. S434 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2013) (state-
ment of Sen. Leahy). For a discussion of the constraints Presidents face in filling
Senate-confirmed positions, ee Anne Joseph O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in
Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 913, 929-31 (2010).
98. 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(1) (2012).
99. Id. § 3(b)(2).
ioo. Examples of internal promotions include Margaret Focarino, Commissioner for
Patents, see Margaret A. (Peggy) Focarino, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
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the PTO's remaining Senior Executive Service (SES) employees, including its
thirty-three Group Directors, are reserved for career employees.'' These career-
reserved positions are considered nonpolitical and are not replaced when the
President changes.'2
3. The Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator
White House supervision of intellectual property enforcement is a recent
phenomenon. In 20o8, the Congress established the Office of the Intellectual
Property Enforcement Coordinator within the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent.0 3 The Coordinator works closely with the PTO, the DOJ, and other feder-
al agencies to develop enforcement priorities.'0 4 However, the Coordinator's
activities are restricted to enforcement and do not extend to substantive intel-
lectual property law.'0 5 And even within this domain, the Coordinator may not
control or direct other federal agencies.6
IV. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS FIRE DISPATCHER
However, the President and other principals are not limited to direct con-
trol mechanisms. Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz's fire-alarm mod-
el of political control predicts that principals will choose to control their agents'
actions through indirect oversight mechanisms that rely on third parties to sig-
nal when those actions violate the principal's goals. Within patent law, the SG
acts as the government's fire dispatcher, raising the alarm when the PTO's poli-
cies diverge from the President's preferences and those of other executive
branch actors. The SG's role thus compensates for the weakness of administra-
tive policy review and other control mechanisms and ensures that patent law
integrates the views of these non-PTO interests, preventing the PTO from mo-
nopolizing policy in this area.
http://patents.uspto.gov/about/bios/focarino commissioner.jsp (last modified
Nov. 21, 2013), and Deborah Cohn, Commissioner for Trademarks, see Deborah
Cohn, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://patents.uspto.gov/about/bios/
cohn-bio.jsp (last modified Jan. 4, 2011).
lOl. SES Positions That Were Career Reserved During CY 2012, 78 Fed. Reg. 28,296,
28,305 (May 14, 2013).
102. See OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT, GUIDE TO THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE 3 (2014).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 8111 (2012).
104. See OFFICE OF U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2011
U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR ANNUAL REPORT ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 8, 24, 27 (Mar. 2012), http://www
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/ipec-annual-201_report.pdf.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 811(b)(1)(D) (2012).
106. Id. § 81n(b)(2).
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A. The Fire-Alarm Model of Political Control
Political scientists recognize that principals choose between direct and indi-
rect oversight regimes given resource constraints. In an influential article,
McCubbins and Schwartz propose that principals will prefer indirect oversight
when (i) the costs of direct oversight are prohibitive, and (2) the costs of indi-
rect oversight will be borne by third parties. Rather than reviewing their agents'
actions directly, principals establish rules, regulations, and procedures, which
encourage third parties to signal to the principal when the agent's actions vio-
late the principal's goals. 0 7 These third parties may seek remedies either from
the principals or through judicial review?" McCubbins and Schwartz contrast
this fire-alarm oversight with police-patrol oversight, under which principals
constantly monitor their agents to detect violations. 9 Although the fire-alarm
model was offered to describe legislative control over agency actions, its princi-
ples also apply to presidential control. As the President's inability to control the
PTO suggests, these institutions face the same cost considerations in imposing
direct oversight. Because it is practically impossible for the President to monitor
every action taken by the PTO, it relies on third parties, including private liti-
gants and other executive actors, instead.
B. Applying the Fire-Alarm Model
In patent law, the SG acts as the government's fire dispatcher, situated at
the intersection between the PTO, the President, and other executive branch
principals and agencies. In this role, the SG decides which alarms are genuine,
which fires can be extinguished, and when and where firefighters should be al-
located. When private litigants allege that a PTO regulation diverges from the
President's preferences or the Supreme Court's precedents, the SG decides
whether these allegations are true and whether the issue is worthy of the Court's
review." ' If the SG decides that review is warranted, the SG selects the United
States' position, given the relevant legal and policy (and political) considera-
tions. In selecting this position, the SG canvasses the government, notifying the
President and other non-PTO actors that the matter is significant and, if neces-
sary, asserting its litigating authority to override the PTO's established policies.
Myriad, analyzed in Parts II and III, exemplifies this pattern. Opposition to
the PTO's guidelines strengthened over time. Public interest litigants challenged
107. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
108. Id.
lo9. Id.
no. The SG's fire dispatch role is possible largely because of its interagency process,
described in Parts I and II. As Myriad shows, the SG's performance of this role is
not limited to cases in which the SG is an amicus. See supra note 45.
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Myriad's patents on the BRCAi and BRCA2 genes in Europe and then the Unit-
ed States."' The SG's control of the Myriad litigation brought the PTO's guide-
lines to the attention of the SG's principals and other agencies and ensured that
the United States' position integrated their perspectives. Moreover, the Myriad
litigation provided these parties with an opportunity to contract the scope of
patent-eligibility without directing the PTO change its rules. By requesting the
Federal Circuit (and later Supreme Court) to invalidate Myriad's patents, the
SG shifted the costs of upsetting reliance interests to the courts and avoiding
unconstitutional takings issues."1 2
Not every Supreme Court case involves this pattern. In some cases, the
PTO will be the only interested government actor. In others, the Court will be
able to identify whether the lower court's decision is worthy of review without
the SG's recommendation.13 Moreover, the fire-alarm model is an idealization.
Despite its best efforts, the SG sometimes fails to identify all government inter-
ests."14 Even if the SG succeeds in doing so, the SG sometimes fails to persuade
the Supreme Court to adopt its recommendations. These failures are unavoida-
ble features of the litigation process-whether litigating authority is centralized
in the DOJ and SG or distributed throughout the PTO and other agencies.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE FIRE ALARM MODEL
The SG acts as the government's fire dispatcher in patent law, and in this
capacity, the SG ensures that patent law integrates the views of the President
and other executive branch actors, not the PTO alone. Ultimately, the desirabil-
ity of this model depends on the desirability of strong presidential control of
agency policymaking and "one's underlying vision of the regulatory state.""' 5
Rather than attempting to resolve these grand debates over presidential con-
trol,"6 this Note attempts a more modest evaluation of the fire-alarm model by
ill. See Gold & Barbone, supra note 86, at S45, S49.
112. The Federal Circuit dismissed Myriad's claims that judicial invalidation of its pa-
tents constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment as "un-
persuasive." Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d. at 221.
113. See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
114. Interview with Days, supra note 18.
115. See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Policymaking: An Empirical In-
vestigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 823 (2003) (noting that "one's position with re-
spect to whether greater presidential control over agencies is desirable or even
possible depends in part on one's underlying vision of the regulatory state").
116. For an overview of these debates, see id. at 830-38. For arguments in favor of
strong presidential control of agency policymaking, see Christopher C. DeMuth
& Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1075, 1o81-82 (1986); and Kagan, supra note 70, at 2331-46. For arguments
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comparing the SG's centralized litigating authority to alternative arrangements.
It argues that the SG's litigating authority over the PTO should not be eliminat-
ed, but that, in cases where the SG's litigating authority conflicts with the need
to accurately present the PTO's views, the SG should authorize the PTO to dis-
sent from the DOJ's brief, and that the Supreme Court should endorse the Fed-
eral Circuit's practice of calling for the PTO's views."1
7
A. Independent Litigating Authority
Independent litigating authority offers an extreme alternative to the SG's
centralized litigating authority. On this model, Congress would eliminate the
SG's litigating authority over the PTO and empower the PTO to conduct litiga-
tion without the need for DOJ authorization."8 Why might independent litigat-
ing authority be desirable? Proponents of independent litigating authority
might argue, in accordance with the beliefs of some agency lawyers, that the
SG's inferior substantive expertise causes it to lose cases that would have been
won if the PTO were to control litigation." 9 However, this conclusion is sus-
pect. First, the SG and the DOJ have developed significant substantive xpertise
in patent law because of the Supreme Court's recent interest. Several members
of the DOJ's Civil Appellate Section consistently represent the PTO on appeal.
against, see Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public
Law: An Essay Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 17-35
(2007).
117. Alternatively, opponents of the SG's litigating authority might argue that the
problems of administrative policy review identified in Part III should be ad-
dressed through increased ex ante policy coordination rather than ex post litiga-
tion. Arti Rai, for example, recommends that Congress formalize consultation be-
tween the PTO and other agencies with interests in patent law. Rai, supra note 85,
at 1279. However, many of the factors that enable the PTO to escape administra-
tive policy review, discussed in Part III, also limit the effectiveness of these sugges-
tions. In particular, the political and policy consequences of the PTO's proposed
rulemaking may not be obvious before their promulgation. See supra Section
III.A. Moreover, the President may be incapable of resolving disputes that arise in
the process of consultation because it does not have strong preferences in patent
law. See supra Section III.A. Consequently, litigation may be the first opportunity
that the President and other principals have to review the PTO's policies with
knowledge of the relevant facts. Finally, implementing controls may be infeasible
because some reforms, including Rai's recommendations, would require amend-
ing the existing statutory scheme.
1n8. For examples of independent litigating authority, see Devins, supra note 10, at
264.
119. See Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation
Authority on Agency Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1361 (2000) ("It is a
longstanding and predictable complaint of agency lawyers that [the] DOJ simply
lacks sufficient knowledge of the particulars of agency programs and the underly-
ing statutes to defend them adequately in court.").
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The SG benefits from the experience of these repeat players, whose names fre-
quently appear on the SG's brief in patent cases before the Court.2 ' Indeed,
these attorneys are so comfortable with patent law issues that they have head-
lined conference panels alongside representatives from the PTO and patent liti-
gation firms.'2' Second, the SG's superior litigating expertise likely outweighs
any avoidable losses caused by its inferior substantive expertise. The SG enjoys
far greater success before the Supreme Court than other litigants at both the
certiorari and merits stages.'22 This success shows that the SG is capable of win-
ning in a variety of technical contexts, and it is unlikely that the complexity of
patent law so exceeds the complexity of these other contexts that it creates any
special problems for the SG's advocacy.'3 Indeed, as Part II argues, this success
is even greater in patent cases.'4 Agencies, acting without the SG's resources and
reputation, are unlikely to match the SG's record. Third, even if the SG does not
have the necessary substantive expertise, the SG benefits from the expertise of
agencies that submit their views during litigation.'25 As Myriad illustrates, the
PTO is only one of many agencies involved in patent policy and related is-
sues.126 The SG's litigating authority recognizes this and allows all interested
agencies to participate in the process of determining the government's position
without giving any single agency a monopoly on policymaking. Consistent with
120. These repeat players compensate for the SG's practice of assigning Assistant Solic-
itors General "on a relatively random basis" with "some consideration ... given to
the specific areas of expertise or existing workload of a given assistant." Richard
G. Wilkins, An Officer and an Advocate: The Role of the Solicitor General, 21 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 1167, 117o n.23 (1988) (reviewing CAPLAN, supra note 7).
121. See, e.g., Mark R. Freeman, Attorney, Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Panel Dis-
cussion at the Fifth Annual Patent Law and Policy Conference at Georgetown
University (Nov. 1, 2013). Mark Freeman argued for the United States in Myriad
IV and was listed on the United States' briefs in Myriad II and V. More recently,
Freeman was listed on the United States' briefs in Teva Pharmaceuticals, Nautilus,
and Consumer Watchdog. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Neither Party, Teva Pharm., USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015)
(No. 13-854); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respond-
ent, Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) (No. 13-369);
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 2. In Consumer Watch-
dog, Freeman also represented the United States during oral argument. See Con-
sumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1259 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
122. Lemos, supra note 7, at 188-89 & nn.13-14.
123. Id.
124. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
126. See Rai, supra note 85, at 1241 (arguing that "the National Institutes of Health
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these three explanations, political scientists studying the DOJ's litigating au-
thority have found little evidence to support the conclusion that DOJ control
causes avoidable losses.'27
Proponents of independent litigating authority might also argue, as critics
of strong presidential control have done, that the SG's control of PTO litigation
politicizes patent policy, undermining the patent system as a system of stable
rights."8 However, this argument is also unpersuasive. First, the intellectual
property system is not a likely candidate for partisan disagreements.'29 Politics,
expressed in cases like Myriad, is the exception, not the norm. Second, the SG's
influence is inherently limited to litigation. The SG cannot announce a change
in the government's position, but must wait for the proper case to arise. Be-
cause the vast majority of private litigants have an interest in the system's stabil-
ity, they are unlikely to seek changes that would dramatically change the system
itself. Third, any significant change in patent law would likely need the approval
of the Supreme Court or Federal Circuit, both of which have, at times, recog-
nized the importance of protecting reliance interests in the existing law.130 Nei-
ther of these institutions is likely to allow successive administrations to mi-
cromanage patent law through litigation.
B. Dual Representation and Calls for Agency Views
However, independent PTO litigating authority is not the only alternative
to the SG's centralized litigating authority. The SG's litigating authority could
be moderated through a variety of reforms. This Section proposes two re-
forms-dual representation and calls for agency views-which, unlike inde-
pendent litigating authority, would preserve the benefits of the fire-alarm mod-
el while ensuring that the PTO's views are accurately represented.
First, in appropriate cases, the SG should allow the PTO to present its views
before the Supreme Court (and Federal Circuit sitting en banc) when the SG or
DOJ's position contradicts the PTO's. Historically, the SG has authorized vari-
ous forms of dual representation in cases involving multiple government inter-
ests.3' Although most of these cases involve independent agencies, the SG has
occasionally authorized executive agencies to represent their positions when
those positions contradicted its own. In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the
127. Herz & Devins, supra note 119, at 1362 (concluding that, although it is difficult to
determine whether agency losses are avoidable, "agency losses, when they occur,
are rarely the consequence of a lawyer's error of a sort that a DOJ lawyer would
make and an agency lawyer would avoid").
128. See Rai, supra note 85, at 1269 ("One common argument against a large adminis-
trative presence in patent law is that patents are property rights and therefore
should not be subject to administrative regulation.").
129. See Bartow, supra note 79, at 719.
130. See sources cited supra note 81.
131. See Devins, supra note io, at 276-277, 314-15.
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SG appended to its brief a Department of Interior Memorandum that opposing
the SG's position.'32 Similarly, in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney, the SG authorized the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Department of La-
bor, and the Department of Defense (DOD) to file a separate amicus brief rais-
ing concerns unaddressed in the SG's brief.'33 And in Bob Jones University v.
United States, the SG successfully requested the Court to appoint a "counsel ad-
versary" to defend the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) policy, when the SG re-
versed its position on appeal.34 The applicability of this practice to the DOJ and
the PTO's briefing disagreements has not gone unnoticed. Indeed, during oral
arguments in Myriad IV, Judge Bryson questioned the SG's decision to not al-
low the PTO to file an addendum dissenting from the DOJ's brief.'35
Dual representation is attractive because it communicates the PTO's posi-
tion to the Court, while protecting the SG's institutional authority. However,
voluntary dual representation has important limits. Although commentators
have argued that the SG may be willing to authorize dual representation, be-
cause it "improves its status as an impartial litigant before the Court and Con-
gress,"'6 Myriad shows that the SG may not be willing to allow the agency to
file a dissenting brief or addendum because it will make the SG's advocacy more
difficult or because it grants special status to the PTO that it does not deserve.
In these cases, the agency may be forced to communicate its disagreement
through other means, for example, by refusing to sign the SG's brief. Although
these signals are likely to be detected by the Court and the litigants, they may
not adequately communicate the policy grounds for the agency's disagreement.
The Court will thus need to rely on other parties, including the SG, private liti-
gants, and amici, and lower court records, to represent the PTO's reasoning,
which these parties may have strategic incentives to misrepresent.
132. See Brief for the Petitioner, App. A, at la-13a, Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153 (1978) (No. 76-1701).
133. See Motion for Leave to File and Brief of the Office of Personnel Management, the
United States Department of Defense, the United States Department of Labor,
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae, Personnel
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (No. 78-233).
134. See Oral Argument Transcript, Goldsboro Christian Sch., Inc. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1, 81-3). For additional discussion, see CAPLAN, supra
note 7, at 51-64; and Neal Devins, Bob Jones University v. United States: A Politi-
cal Analysis, 1 J.L. & POL. 403, 411 (1984).
135. Audio Tape: Oral Arguments, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (30:55),
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/audiomp3/2o0o-14o6_72o2o12.mp3. Nota-
bly, Judge Bryson, who dissented in Myriad II and III, served as Assistant to the
Solicitor General from 1978 to 1979, when Hill was decided.
136. Devins, supra note io, at 277.
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To solve these problems, the DOJ could formalize the PTO's dual represen-
tation through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or similar agree-
ment. The DOJ regularly enters into MOUs defining the scope of the DOJ's liti-
gating authority over other federal agencies.'37 If the DOJ chooses this option,
the MOU's provisions should be made public. Non-PTO actors' (including pri-
vate litigants') increasing interest in substantive patent law increases opportuni-
ties for conflict between the DOJ and the PTO, and the fire-alarm model's effec-
tiveness depends on the signals sent by private litigants. If litigants cannot
determine whether the PTO or the DOJ will control the government's litigating
position-and consequently, whether their signals will reach likeminded prin-
cipals within the executive branch-then the model will perform sub-optimally.
Second, the Supreme Court should follow the initiative of the Federal Cir-
cuit and order the PTO, in relevant cases, to submit its views to the Court."38
The Court could blunt the political effects of this order, again following the
Federal Circuit, by allowing the SG and the agency to file a combined brief.'
39
Such orders would perform an information-forcing function and expose the
latter's expert views and the depth of the DOJ and the PTO's disagreement.
However, the Court, unlike the Federal Circuit, may not be knowledgeable
enough about the PTO's established position or the interagency politics be-
tween the DOJ and the PTO to know when such an order is likely to be effec-
tive.'4° In these cases, the Court may be better off allowing the Federal Circuit to
make this determination and refraining from calling for the views of the PTO
when the Federal Circuit does not.
CONCLUSION
Commentators have invented numerous titles to describe the SG's institu-
tional role. An incomplete list includes "the Tenth Justice,"4' "the Court's
Ninth-and-a-Half Member,"'142 "the Thirty-Fifth Law Clerk,"'43 "an Executive
137. See Herz & Devins, supra note 119, at 1354.
138. See Order, Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., No. 13-1377
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 4, 2013).
139. Id.
140. The Federal Circuit may also be a better positioned to make this decision because
intragovernmental conflicts are more common in federal courts of appeals. See
Devins, supra note io, at 313 & n.331.
141. CAPLAN, supra note 7.
142. Kathryn Mickle Werdegar, The Solicitor General and Administrative Due Process: A
Quarter-Century of Advocacy, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 481, 482 (1968).
143. Roger Clegg, Book Review, The Thirty-Fifth Law Clerk, 1987 DUKE L.J. 964 (re-
viewing CAPLAN, supra note 7).
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Agent,"414 "a Judicial Agent,"1 45 "an Officer and an Advocate,' '146 and "the Me-
diator Between Court and Agency. ' 147 This Note adds yet another title to this
collection: the Government's Fire Dispatcher. This title captures an important
aspect of the SG's role. The SG performs a particular function within the bu-
reaucratic structure of patent law. Like a fire dispatcher, the SG notifies the
President when the PTO departs from its preferences. The SG determines which
cases are worthy of review and which position the government should adopt. In
doing so, the SG combines generalist and specialist perspectives-merging the
authority and knowledge of the President, the PTO, and other principals and
agencies-and enforces the boundaries between competing government institu-
tions. The SG's role is a contingent response to the Court's increasing interest in
patent law, and the President's and Court's need to oversee the specialized insti-
tutions that manage it. Although this structure has led to at least one high-
profile conflict between the SG and the PTO, these conflicts are not a sign of
dysfunction. Rather, they show that it is working precisely as it should.
144. Louis Fisher, Book Review, Is the Solicitor General an Executive or Judicial Agent?:
Caplan's Tenth Justice, 15 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 305 (1992) (reviewing CAPLAN, supra
note 7).
145. Id.
146. Richard G. Wilkins, An Officer and an Advocate: The Role of the Solicitor General,
21 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1167 (1988) (reviewing CAPLAN, supra note 7).
147. Lemos, supra note 7.
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APPENDIX A: TABLE OF CASES
The Solicitor General's Participation in Patent
eral Circuit, OT 2oo8-2o1448
Name order No(s).














2010 10-844 Y Grant









148. This table includes cases in which the SG participated as a party or as an amicus at
the certiorari or merits stages. It excludes, for example, cases in which the Su-
preme Court granted the petition and summarily vacated and remanded the lower
court's decision without issuing a CVSG order. See, e.g., WildTangent, Inc. v. Ul-
tramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012) (mem.). It also excludes patent-related cases
appealed from courts other than the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); Kimble v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 727 F.3d 856, (9 th Cir. 2013),
cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 781 (Dec. 12, 2014) (No. 13-720).
CVSG orders were identified using the methodology developed by David
Thompson and Melanie Wachtell. Using custom software, the author searched
the Court's electronic docket for orders containing "Federal Circuit" and phrases
indicating that a CVSG order had been issued. See David C. Thompson & Melanie
F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Procedures:
The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 237, app. at 297-98 (2009). For similar tables, see Duffy, supra note
26, at 531 fig.5; Stephenson, supra note 26, app. at 292-299.
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15o. The SG represented the petitioner.
151. The SG did not file a brief, but argued for the petitioners in the case below.
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152. The case was dismissed pursuant to a Rule 46 motion from the parties. The SG
did not submit a brief. See Order, Maersk Drilling USA, Inc. v. Transocean Off-
shore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., No. 13-43 (May 21, 2014) (mem.).
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